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A. L. HAWSE 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ISSUES 
This is a pure bill of discovery filed by Lee Long 
against A. L. Hawse. · 
Hawse has brought an action at law against Long on 
twelve negotiable promissory notes executed by Long and 
held by Hawse. ( R. p. 2.) Long admits that he executed 
the notes (R. p. 3.) 
Long's defense is that the notes sued on were renewals 
of original notes obtained fraudulently by S. M. Newton 
with the knowledge of Hawse. (R. pp. 3, 17, 26, et seq.) 
It is important to bear in mind that there were two 
series of. notes, referred to .throughout the record as the 
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Qriginal notes and. the renewal notes. The renew a] notes 
are also referred to as ·the notes sued on or the notes men-
tioned in tlle· notice of motion for judgment. 
·· ·.·~The fraud oomplained of. by Long is alleged by· him to 
invalidate the original no.tes. . The discovery he demands 
~·.riot ~nc~rn ·the original notes, but only the renewal 
notes. 
In his petition for appeal, Long alleges (R. pp. 3, 4.) : 
'' (c) That the notes in the notice aforesaid men-
tioned were renewals of the original notes dated May 
18, 1923, (which had been discounted) which renew-
als were. given at the express instance and request 
of said Hawse (and later taken up by him) with the 
express ~eement at the time of such renewals that 
said renewals in the hands of said Hawse would be 
subject to the same defenses and off-sets to which the 
originals would have been subject to in the hands of 
said Newton." 
And in his plea filed in the action at law, Long alleged, 
(R. p .. 30): 
''Thereupon, the said A. L. Hawse, upon whose 
endorsement the said notes had been discounted, ap-
proached the said defendant and requested him, as 
· ali· accommodation to him and to the said Peerless 
. on··company of which he was a director u.nd stock-
. holder, and to save him and the said Peerless 011 
Company from great loss and injury and to prevent 
. . the liolders. of said notes of the defendant .from then 
~d there· insisting upon the payment of said notes 
and . taking steps to enforce the payment thereof 
~ · · · ·.:~in;st said Hawse, to renew the same, and this· the 
· ., .. _, ·· .;· said defendant at the special instance and request 
· :, ... Qf: the ,said A. L. Hawse .agreed· to do,- with the. dis-
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tinct understanding and agreement with . the said 
A. L. Hawse and upon the condition that as between 
this defendant, the said A. L. Haw:se, and the Peer-
less Oil Company, tpere .would be no liability upon 
this defendant, and this 'defe~dant would have the 
right to set up and ·avail himself of all the defences 
which he theretofore ·bad or might be. entitled to 
against the payment of said notes should the same 
be thereafter taken up by the. said A. L. Hawse, the 
said S. M. Newton, or the said Peerless Oil Com-
pany.'' · 
It thus appears that the notes sued on were handed 
directly by Long to. Hawse. Long must. therefore know 
who Hawse got the notes from and the circumstances at-
tending their delivery. The discovery sought is contained 
in three interrogatories, (R. p. 19) : · 
'' 1. What connection, if any, did he and the said 
S. M. Newton have with the organization and con-
duct _of the Peerless Oil C~mpany of l{ansas, Inc. Y 
"2. 'Vhen and under what ch·cumstances did he 
becon1e the holder of the notes and each of them set 
forth and referred to in the notice of the motion for 
judgment herein Y 
'' 3. From whom did he receive the said notes and 
each of then1, and what was the consideration for 
the transfer and delivery of said notes and each of 
then1 to him, the said Hawse Y '' 
These interrogatories say nothing whatever about the 
original notes, but ask only about the renewal notes, the 
notes referred to ~n the notice of motion for judgment 
Long's defense is based on the allegation that the o:riginal 
notes were obtained from him fraudulently and his inter-
rogatories refer only to the renewal notes, and his plead-
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ings show that he gave the renewal notes directly to 
Hawse and that the consideration was the surrender of 
the original notes. Consequently the claims made by Long 
on this appeal that a discovery of the fraud practiced on 
1.ll.ID in··obtaining the original notes ·is essential to his de-
fense are beside the point. Even if Long were entitled to 
a discovery of the circumstances under which the original 
notes were obtained, it would be immaterial on this ap-
peal, because .his bill does not ask ·for discovery of those 
circumstances. 
Before bringing this· bill for discovery, Long made two 
previous efforts to obtain the same relief, first, by asking 
for a bill of particulars (R. pp. 35, 36) and, second, by 
filing interrogatories in the law suit, (R. pp. 33, 34, 35). 
-That the discovery sought in the law suit was the saine 
as that prayed in the equity suit appears by comparing 
the interrogatories in the law suit (R. p. 34) with those in 
the equity suit (R. p. 19), and is conceded by appellant 
(R. p. 5). 
There· are only three issues presented by this appeal: 
1. Is a party entitled to discovery of facts which he 
swears he knows? (R. pp. 30, 31, 32. The transcript 
fails to show ·execution of the affidavit but since the 
statute requires the plea to be sworn to it can be assumed 
that this was done). · 
2. Will a bill of discovery lie in Virginia in cases where 
the remedy at law is adequate? 
3. After filing interrogatories in the law suit, may the 
party withdraw the interrogatories and have a bill in 
eqUity for discovery? 




A PARTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY OF 
FACTS HE ALREADY KNOWS 
Vve have shown in the foregoing statement that Long 
handed the notes sued on to Hawse as renewals of the 
notes previously given and that, according to Long's own 
plea and petition for appeal, he was an eye-witness of the 
principal facts whicbl he asks Hawse to discover. Thwt a 
bill of discovery was never meant for such a purpose is 
recognized by the allegations of the bill :filed in thi"s case. 
The bill alleges (R. p. 19) that Long cannot safely go to 
trial without the discovery and that the things referred 
to. ''are peculiarly within the knowledge of the said 
Hawse." 
The first requisite of any bill in equity is that the com-
plainant needs relief. In the case of a. bill of discovery, 
the complainant must show that he needs information. 
In the case of a mixed bill of discovery he must show that 
the information is indispensible to him. But even in the 
case of a pure bill of discovery, such as we have here, he 
must show that he stands in some need of the information. 
In 18 C. J. 1067, speaking of a bill of discovery, it is 
said: 
''It cannot be maintained to discover matter 
whereof complainant has the same means of infor-
mation as defendant ... "\Vhere the bill and the ex-
hibits show that the complainant already has the in-
formation he pretends to seek, discovery will be 
denied.'' 
In McFarland v. Hunte·r, 81Leigh 489, the court points 
out that in a mixed bill of discovery the plaintiff must 
show that he has no other means of proving his case. The 
rule in_ regard to a pure b~ll ~s not so ~tr~gent. But eve~ 
m a ptire bill, the complainant must at least ''think some 
of the links defective and·that the discovery may bema-
terial and necessary to make them perfect.'' ( 8 Leigh 
at page 493, quoted iil petition for appeal, page 14. In 
the original report only the word ''material'' is italicized). 
·There is nothing inconsistent with our theory of the 
law in the dictum from Larkey v. Gardner, 105 Va. 718, 
quoted from and italicized on page 13 of the petition for 
appeal. The dictum is to the effect that in a pure bill of 
discovery, the complainant need only show that he seeks 
the aid of the court of ~quity ~'to make the applicant 
stronger in a court of la1iJ. '' ·. If. the applicant already 
knows the facts, the discovery will not make hhn any 
stronger. . . 
A case on all fours ·with the case at bar is Duratnt v. 
Goss, 12 F. (2d) 682, (C. C. A., 6th C., 1926). 
· ~hat was a pure bill of discoyery: . Durant had sue(J 
Goss at law fo~_converting 1900 sh~. of Chevrolet stock, 
which he had. loaned to Goss. In qenying Durant's right 
to have a bill of discovery in aid or liis action at law, the 
court said, (p. 68"3) : 
''Plaintiff has equal knowledge with defendant 
whether these shares of stock were or were not 
· loaned bi him to defendant, nor. does plaintiff re .. 
quire any disclosure. from the defendant to prepare 
his pleadings.'' 
Point II .. 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AID 0}, 
A COURT OF EQUITY, BECAUSE THE 
REMEDY AT LAW IS ADEQUATE · 
Sections. 6~36 and 6237 of. the Code of Virginia give the 
appellant a complete and adequate remedy at law and a 
much speedier remedy than was ever obtainable in equity. 
· They give him the right to have answers given and papers 
produced in advance of the trial at law in all cases where 
l1e could have had such relief in a court of equity. 
Section 6238 of the Code p~ovides : 
''The two preceding sections shall not preclude a 
person, who does not file such interrogatories or 
affidavit, from exhibiting his bill in chancery for a 
discovery, as he might have done if. the ·said sec-
tions bad not been. enacted.'' 
If the said sections. had not been enacted,. the party 
could exhibit his bill in chancery for a discovery, if 
the remedy at law was not adequate. The statute saves 
hil!l· the right to a bill of discovery when the remedy at 
law. is. not· adequate. But in considering whether the 
remedy at law is adequate, it must be borne in mind that 
the party is· to-day entitled to examine the adverse party 
in a law suit as a witness and is entitled to file interroga-
tories before trial. In other words, OUr pOSition is that 
the purpose of Section ·_623S. is to pre~erve the old equity 
jurisdiction subject to. the ~arne prin~iples that have 
always governed the eqwty jurisdiction. . tf, for any 
reason~ it should turn out that sootions 6236· and 6237 did 
not ·give as full and complete, relief as a' bill ·in equity, 
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then, and only then, a bill in equity could be exhibited. 
Those sections, for example, do not permit discovery of 
a chattel. In such case the remedy at law would still be 
inadequate. 
In_'Fren.ch v. Stange Mining Co., 133 Va. 602, the court 
refused to entertain a mixed bill of discovery on the 
ground that the remedy at law was adequate, saying, (pp. 
616; 617, 618): 
''All · the information here demanded would be 
rea.diJy available in an action at law. The defendant 
shippers themselves are competent witnesses and 
may be compelled to testify for complainants; and 
sections 6236 and 6237 of the Code of 1919 (sections 
3370 and 3371, Code of 1887) ptl"ovide a simple and 
adequate method whereby, upon proper affidavit or 
interrogatories, these defendant shippers may be re-
quired to furnish in detail all such information, and 
all their books and writings relevant thereto. 
"In Lile's Equity Pleading & Practice (2d ed.), 
section 152, the author says : 'Bills of discovery are 
now, with us, in large measure, superseded in practice 
by two statutory provisions, one allowing a court of 
law to compel a discovery on oath, in answet· to in-
terrogatories filed, where it would be compelled .upon 
a bill of discovery, if the interrogatories have not 
heen unreasonably delayed; and the other declaring 
parties to S'ltits competent to give evidence on their 
own behalf, and to be competent and compellable to 
attend and give evidence on behalf of any other 
party to the proceeding.' 
"And, to like effect, in Burks' Notes on Equity 
Procedure, page 39, it is said: 'Now that the -de-
fenda~ts are competent witnesses and may be ex-
amined by the complainant on any matter involved 
m the litigation, it is very rare· that a defendant is 
called upon for relief of this kind, as the complainant 
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·has ample remedy by sections 3370 and 3371 of. the 
Cod.e.' . (Sections 623~ and 6237, Code. 1919.) 
. ''It. i~ true that section 6238 of the Code (section 
3372, Code of 1887) provides that 'the· two preceding 
sections shall no.t preclude .a. person, who 'does not 
file such intet•rogatories or affidavit, from exhibiting 
his bill in chancery for a discovery, as he might have 
done if the said sections .had not been enacted.' .But 
this provision has no effect upon the rule already 
pointed out that where, as here, the disclosure is 
sought for the enforce'Ill:ent of a purely legal demand 
tl1e diRcovery must .be essential to the plaintiff's case. 
The statutes referred to do not abolisli the. relief in 
pure bills of discovery, or in bills for disc()very iri 
aid of the enforcement of an equitable right;. but it 
would seem that they do have the effiect of eliminat-
ing this remedy 'in mixed bills of discovery, when 
the jurisdiction at law is sought to be transferred to 
a court of equity, on the sole ground that discovery 
in equity is necessary.' Johnson v. Mundy,-123 Va. 
730, 744, 97 S. E. 564, 569. At any rate, if the 
statutes in question do not go to the full extent here 
suggested, it is clear that they reduce to a minimum 
the cases in which a discovery in equity may be 
availed of in transferring to that forum jurisdiction 
of a legal cause of action. The cases must be rare 
· indeed, if any, in which, ·under the broad provisions 
of our present statutes, a plaintiff may not obtain as 
full disclosure in aid of his 1ega1· cause of E,t.Ction as 
he could obtain by a bill of disc9very. If there be 
such exceptional cases, this is not one of th~m.'' 
We submit .that the reasoning :which the court applied 
to a mixed bill applies equally to a ptt.re bill. What the 
court did was to place the right' of complainant to exhibit 
his bill on".the sit.nie grounds·· as before. th~ statute was 
passed; liut in considering :. wheth~r . the . discovery in 
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equity was essentittl to complainant the court did not shut 
its eyes to the existing statutory, legal remedies. So, in 
passing on the right to :file a pu're bill o~ discovery, the 
court should also consider the existing statutory reme-
dies in'deciding whether the complainant has any need Ol'l 
use whatever for the interposition of the extraordinary 
powers of a c~urt of eq~ty. 
·It has always been the practice of courts of equity to 
refuse discovery in aid of another suit, if the.court where 
the other suit was· pending had power to compel the dis-
covery. Mr. Justice Story, writing long before parties 
were compellable to testify at law, said, (Equity Juris., 
14th ed., sec. 1943): 
"In the ·next place Courts of Equity· will not en-
tertain a bill for a. discovery to assist a. snit in an-
. · · other court if the latter is of itself competent to 
grant the same relief; for in such a case the proper 
exercise of the jurisdiction should be ]eft to the 
· functionaries of the court where the suit is depend-
ing.''· 
we· submit that ·this well known principle of equity 
jurisprudence was not ~eant to be abolished by the sec-
tion of the Code preserving the right to a bill of discovery . 
.Analogies from· other jurisdictions ·lead to the same re-
sult. Under the New York practice, the adverse party 
may be examined orally befor~ the trial of a law suit. In 
Fur~ Wool Trading Co. v. Gearge I. Fox> 2~5 N.Y. 215, 
1~6· N. E. 670; (1927), the cou.rt said: 
''. . . the action ma.y not be sustained as a bill of 
.. :discovery, brought as such a .bill was, not as an end 
. in itself but as an aid to an independent proceeding. 
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A .complete remedy of this character being· otherwise 
provided, such an aetio~ no longer survives.'·' 
United StateS Revised Statutes sec. 724 (U. S. C. A .. 
Title 28, sec. 636) empowers the law court to compel the 
adverse party' to produce.doc~ents material to the case. 
The production is compellable only at the trial and not 
before the trial (Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533) and 
to that extent is less valuable than a bill of discovery. 
Nevertheless, the federal courts hold that if production 
at the trial is all a party needs! it is all he can have and a 
bi II of discovery will not· lie. 
In Duroot v. Goss, 12 F. (2d) 682, previously cited 
above, the court said: · -
_ ''Section 724, R. S., has so enlarged the powers of 
courts of law to order and require the production of 
books or writings m . the possession or control .of 
either plaintiff or defendant as to make the equitable 
remedy pt•actically unnecessary, but it does not affect 
the jurisdiction of a court of equity ·to ·entertain ·a 
bill of discovery in aid of an action at law, where the 
bill presents a case calling for the e~ercise of such 
p<;)wer. Carpenter v. Winn, supra; General Film 
Co. v. Sampliner (C. C. A. 6) 232 F. ·95, 146 C: C .. A. 
287. If the legal remedies .are s¢licient, the jurisdic-
tion will not be exercised. Like any· other equitable 
remedy, it is exceptional, and .the plaintiff must 
bring himself within the exception.'' 
• • * • ... 
''The plaintiff has filed in the law action, in aid of 
which this bill of discovery is :filed, a petition and 
motion for an order requiring defendant to produce 
books· and ~tings in. his· possassi~n~ . _Und~r $e 
. provisions of· section 724, ·-R ... S:,. the c~urt in which 
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the law action is pending has authority to grant him 
all the relief in this respect to which he .is entitled. 
His bill of complaint in this case, read in connection 
with his petition in the law action, presents no such 
state of facts as would require the intervention of a 
court of equity by the exercise of its power to com-
pel disclosures.'' 
In Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. B-roorn, 213 U. S. 25, 50, 
-the court said : 
"Equity does not now take jurisdiction in cases 
of fraud where the relief pt•operly obtained on that 
ground can be obtained in a court of law, and where, 
so far as necessary, discovery may be obtained as 
well as in equity.'' 
In considering the probable meaning of Code Section 
6238, we ma.y advert to the probable policy of the legisla-
ture in providing for discovery at law. That policy must 
have been not merely to allow discovery, because that was 
·already obtainable in equity. The main policy must have 
been to avoid the expense and delay of separate and an-
cillary proceedings in a different court. Indeed the very 
reason why the appellant in this case resorted to the legal 
remedy in the first instance was ''in the hope of avoiding 
the delay tha.t would be involved in a resort to a court of 
chancery,'' (R. p. 5). The record in the case at bar dem-
onstrates that the policy of preventing delay will be de-
feated unless this court applies the rule fot·eshadowed in 
French v. Stange Mining Co., sup·ra; that the equitable 
remedy is available only when the legal remedy is in-
adequate. The notice of motion was originally returnable 
·On J)ecem.ber 19, 1928. (R. p. 20).- It was not until April 
16; 1929, that appellant filed his interrogatories in the 
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clerk's.office. (R. p. 34). By thattime thecase·had been 
set for trial by order of the court. ( R. p. 34). · The ap-
pellant then obtained a .continuance over the objection of 
appell~e until Jnne·lS, 192~, ~n the gro~d of an absent 
witness. (R. p. 34). · Pe~ding this continuance, and on 
April24, 1929, the bill for discovery was filed. (R. p. 16). 
On May 24, 1929, the Chancery Court dismissed the bill. 
(R. p. 36). On June 14, 1929, four days before the date 
set for the trial of the action at law, the petition for appea.l 
was filed. The record of course does not show when the 
~ction at law will be tried, but it shows that the delay will 
be considerable, in spite of the fact that tw~ eminent 
judges, those presiding respectively over the Law & 
:E~quity Court and the Chancery Court of the City of Rich-
mond, have decided, quite apart from matters of proce-
dure, that appellant is not entitled to any discovery at all. 
Point III. 
BY FILING INTERROGATORIES IN THE LA "\V 
SillT, APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM 
SEIDKING THE SAME RELIEF IN EQUITY 
The learned chancellot• in the· com.1; below, in .addition 
to holding, by sustaining the demurrer, that appellant 
was not entitled to relief by way of discovery; also held, 
by sustaining plea number one, that even if appellant 
would have been entitled to relief in equity, he abandoned 
that remedy by first applying for the s~me relief to the 
law court. 
Piea in bar number one .(.R. ,p. 33) all.~ged that Long 
.had :fil~d interrogatories in the law court and was there--
fore precluded from coming into equity. W~t )lapp~ned 
in the law co1,1r.t is shown- b.y th~. orde;r of the ·_Law & 
Equity Court copied on pages 34 and 35 of the r~cord. 
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Long filed his interrogato1ies seeking the same relief 
he now asks and Hawse, by motion to quash the summons, 
objected that the interrogatories were not such as he was 
required to answer. After argument, the court announced 
that in its opinion the position taken by Hawse was cor-
rect and should be sustained. Long then, by leave of the 
court, and over the objection of Hawse, withdrew the in-
terrogatories. 
Code section 6238 says : 
''But a person :filing such interrogatories or affida-
vit, shall not afterwards exhibit a bill in equity 
against the same party for the discovery or produc-
tion of the same matters.'' 
The interrogatories were filed in the law court, not only 
by filing in the clerk's office, but also by order of the 
court. The language of the order is (R. p. 34): 
'' . . . the summons containing said interroga-
tories being now filed and made a part of the 
record ... '' 
It is true that the interrogatories were then stricken 
from the record, but the statute expressly ba.rs a bill in 
equity if the interrogatories have been once :filed and con-
tains no exception if they are afterwards withdrawn. The 
manifest purpose of this part of the statute is to keep 
the party seeking discovery from harrassing his adver-
sary by repeated applications for the same relief. · If 
appellant's p~sition be c()rrect, the party seeking dis-
covery would always have two chances of getting it, once 
at law and once again in equity. 
We submit that section 6238 should not be construed 
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with reference to the technicalities defining what papers 
have been ''filed'' so as to constitute part of the record. 
It should be so construed as to produce equality of right 
between both parties and not leave it to the option of the 
party filing interrogatories to withdraw them if the de-
cision of the court is· about to go against him. The pur-
pose of the statute is visible on its face. It was to substi-
tute a simple and expeditious remedy for the former pro-
cedure in equity; it was not to substitute two proceed-
. ings for the previously existing single proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is not entitled to discovery either at law or 
equity. That is the decision of two courts. Appellant 
already knows the facts, or claims to know the fa.Cts of 
which he seeks discovery. Of course appellee's demurrer 
does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law. 
The statutory legal discovery preserves the bill in 
equity only in cases when it would lie at common law, 
namely when complainant could not get the same relief 
in the law court. Any relief to which appellant is en-
titled, he can obtain in the law court. 
Independently of the correctnes~ of our first two 
propositions, section 6238 forbids application to a court 
of equity, after interrogatories have been filed in the law 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAMS & MULLEN, 
CYRUS w. BEALE, 
RALPH T. CATTERALL, 
Attorneys for Appellee. 
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